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TRADEMARK PARODY: HOW TO BALANCE THE
LANHAM ACT WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Kelly L. Baxter*
I. INTRODUCTION
Although the Supreme Court has given full First
Amendment protection to expressions about philosophical, so-
cial, artistic, economic, literary, and ethical issues,' the level
of protection afforded to parodies of trademarks remains an
unsolved issue.2 Historically, the Lanham Act' has prohibited
any use of a trademark that would harm the trademark's
good will.4 However, public policy considerations deem im-
portant both the protection of the right to parody another's
trademark and the protection of one's trademark investment
and good will.'
This comment focuses on how courts inconsistently re-
solved the problem of reconciling the Lanham Act with First
Amendment freedom of speech rights. First, the comment
gives a brief history of the development of trademark law,
specifically the Lanham Act and the Federal Trademark Dilu-
tion Act of 1995.6 Next, the comment describes the First
Amendment as a defense7 and how parody represents a de-
* Editor-in-Chief, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 44. J.D. Candidate,
Santa Clara University School of Law; B.S.E., University of Michigan.
1. SeeAbood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977).
2. See Anthony Pearson, Note, Commercial Trademark Parody, the Fed-
eral Trademark Dilution Act, and the First Amendment, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 973,
999 (1998).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1129 (2004).
4. See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604
F.2d 200, 205 (2d Cir. 1979) (quoting Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346
F. Supp. 1183, 1189 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)).
5. See Siegrun D. Kane, Trademark Law: A Practitioner's Guide, 4
PRACTICING LAW INST. § 12:1.3 (4th ed. 2002).
6. See discussion infra Part II.A-B.
7. See discussion infra Part II.C.
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fense to the unauthorized use of another's trademark.8 After
identifying the lack of a uniformly applied parody defense to
trademark uses,9 the comment then compares various courts'
interpretations of the Lanham Act as applied to cases involv-
ing parody. ° Finally, this comment proposes amendments to
the Act to define a parody defense and to suggest guidelines
for courts to follow in order to interpret the parody defense in
trademark infringement and dilution causes of action."
II. BACKGROUND
To understand the legal consequences of a trademark
parody, the development of various laws must be considered.
Historians have traced the long history of trademark law and
trademark infringement, 2 but dilution is a newer form of
trademark protection. 3 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has




A trademark is a word, name, symbol, device, or any
combination of these designations that is used to identify and
distinguish a person's goods from the goods of others and to
indicate the source of the goods." A service mark is a trade-
mark used with regard to services."
1. The Development of Trademarks
Trademarks date back to ancient times when they were
used to indicate ownership of goods made by local guilds."' As
commercial trade expanded, trademarks began to function as
a source identification of the goods."
8. See discussion infra Part II.D-F.
9. See discussion infra Part III.
10. See discussion infra Part IV.
11. See discussion infra Part V.
12. See Sidney A. Diamond, The Historical Development of Trademarks, 65
TRADEMARK REP. 265, 266 (1975).
13. See discussion infra Part II.B.
14. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
15. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2004).
16. See id.




Under contemporary use, trademarks attract and inform
consumers as well as distinguish products. 19  Trademarks
serve three different functions: source identification, consis-
tency guarantee, and advertising medium. °
The protection of trademarks has arisen to maintain
commercial morality and fair dealing in the marketplace21
and has a strong basis in economic principles.22 With effective
trademark protection, trademark holders reap the benefits of
a superior reputation through the improvement of product
quality or service.2' To consumers, trademarks represent a
guarantee of consistency such that the goods bought today
will be of the same quality as the goods bearing the same
trademark that were bought yesterday.4
As the markets for goods and services extended to wide
areas, trademarks began to serve an important purpose in
advertisements." Placing a mark that signified a favorable
reputation led to sales based on the good will of the mark
generated through advertising.2 Trademarks have become
an indispensable part of today's economic system because
they are the only practical means for the consumer to select a
particular good or service from among the variety of choices
available to them that meet the individual needs of that con-
sumer.
27
2. The Lanham Act
The origin of U.S. trademark law can be traced to the
common law action for deceit that resulted when a consumer
purchased a product labeled with a competitor's trademark."
Trademarks continue to have a sustained history of protec-
19. See Steven M. Perez, Comment, Confronting Biased Treatment of
Trademark Parody Under the Lanham Act, 44 EMORY L.J. 1451, 1456 (1995).
20. See Diamond, supra note 12, at 289-90.
21. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 cmt. c (1995).
22. See Karen Levy, Note, Trademark Parody: A Conflict Between Constitu-
tional and Intellectual Property Interests, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 425, 429
(2001).
23. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 cmt. c.
24. See Diamond, supra note 12, at 289.
25. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 cmt. c.
26. See id.
27. See Diamond, supra note 12, at 290.
28. See Daniel M. McClure, Trademarks and Unfair Competition: A Critical
History ofLegal Thought, 69 TRADEMARK REP. 305, 311-12 (1979).
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29tion under common law and state statutes.
With authority granted under the Commerce Clause, °
Congress enacted the Lanham Act"' on July 5, 1947 to federal-
ize much of the trademark common law and to protect trade-
marks from infringement and unfair competition. 2 In its re-
port on the Lanham Act, the Senate Committee conveyed the
rationale that to protect trademarks is to "protect the public
from deceit, to foster fair competition, and to secure to the
business community the advantages of reputation and good
will by preventing their diversion from those who have cre-
ated them to those who have not."3 Thus, the Act has main-
tained the same dual goals of common law to protect consum-
ers from the likelihood of confusion and to protect trademark
owners from misappropriation."
3. Trademark Infringement
The Lanham Act protects against the infringement of
both unregistered35 marks and marks registered with the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office.36 A test of the likelihood of con-
fusion establishes whether infringement has occurred and
29. See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879). "The right to adopt and use
a symbol or a device to distinguish the goods or property... to the exclusion of
use by all other persons, has been long recognized by the common law ...." Id.
at 92.
30. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("Congress shall have the Power... to
regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with
the Indian tribes.").
31. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1129 (2004).
32. See id. § 1127. The intent of the Lanham Act is
to regulate commerce within the control of Congress by making action-
able the deceptive and misleading use of marks in such commerce; to
protect registered marks used in such commerce from interference by
State, or territorial legislation; to protect persons engaged in such
commerce against unfair competition; to prevent fraud and deception in
such commerce by the use of reproductions, copies, counterfeits, or col-
orable imitations of registered marks; and to provide rights and reme-
dies stipulated by treaties and conventions respecting trademarks,
trade names, and unfair competition entered into between the United
States and foreign nations.
Id.
33. S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 3 (1946).
34. See Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985)
(stating that "[t]he Lanham Act provides national protection of trademarks in
order to secure to the owner of the mark the goodwill of his business and to pro-
tect the ability of consumers to distinguish among competing producers").
35. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125.
36. See id. § 1114.
2004 TRADEMARKPARODY 1183
serves as the basic test for both common law and federal
statutory trademark infringement.37 Although circuit courts
refer to them by different names, this comment will call the
likelihood of confusion test the "Polaroid" factors.3" The
"Polaroid" factors compare the trademark owner's use to that
of the accused infringer's use of the mark to determine
whether the public is likely to be confused.39
B. Dilution
Frank Schechter is credited with creating the idea of di-
lution in his 1927 article, The Rational Basis of Trademark
Protection." Schechter argued that the "preservation of the
uniqueness of a trademark" is the essential trademark right
that amounted to a property right belonging to the owner of a
distinctive trademark.4'
Trademark dilution,4" unlike trademark infringement, oc-
curs when the distinctive quality of a strong trademark, used
to identify the source of goods or services bearing that mark,
is diminished over time due to unauthorized acts of third par-
ties.43 A weakening of a mark's ability to distinguish its
source can occur through "blurring" or "tarnishment."" Dilu-
37. See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 4 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 23:01 (4th ed. 2002).
38. See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir.
1961).
39. See id. The Polaroid factors include (1) strength of plaintiffs mark; (2)
degree of similarity between plaintiffs and defendant's marks; (3) proximity of
the products or services; (4) likelihood that plaintiff will bridge the gap; (5) evi-
dence of actual confusion; (6) defendant's good faith in adopting the mark; (7)
quality of defendant's product or service; and (8) sophistication of the buyers.
Id.
40. Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40
HARv. L. REV. 813 (1927). Instead of consumer confusion, the actual damage
from concurrent use of a mark on different goods is the "gradual whittling away
or dispersion of the identity and hold upon the public mind of the mark or name
by its use upon non-competing goods." Id. at 825.
41. Id. at 831.
42. Dilution is "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify
and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of--(1)
competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2)
likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2004).
43. See MCCARTHY, supra note 37, § 24:70. "The dilution theory grants pro-
tection to strong, well-recognized marks even in the absence of a likelihood of
confusion, if defendant's use is such as to diminish or dilute the strong identifi-
cation value of the plaintiffs mark even while not confusing customers as to
source, sponsorship, affiliation or connection." Id.
44. See id. § 24:67.
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tion by blurring arises when consumers see the trademark
holder's mark used on the products of the infringer, resulting
in a weakening of the trademark's distinctiveness and ability
to distinguish the source. 45 For example, DuPont shoes, Buick
aspirin tablets, and Kodak pianos hypothesize trademark use
that dilutes the strength of a mark through blurring.48
Tarnishment results when the unauthorized use of a
trademark degrades any positive associations of the mark in
the minds of the consumers. 47 To illustrate the tarnishment
of a famous trademark, consider Deere & Co. v. MTD Prod-
ucts, Inc. 8 A competitor lawn tractor company created an
animated commercial in which the MTD tractor frightened
the Deere & Co.'s trademarked deer.4 '9  Because the court
found that the alteration of the trademark significantly
weakened the positive association with Deere & Co.'s product,
the court enjoined the junior user from tarnishing the reputa-
tion of the trademark. ° Although blurring and tarnishment
are defined differently, they both lessen the distinctive qual-
ity of the trademark and weaken its selling power."
1. State Anti-Dilution Laws
Anti-dilution statutes arose to fill the void left by the
failure of trademark infringement law to stop the unauthor-
ized use of marks when there was no likelihood of confusion.52
In 1947, Massachusetts adopted the first state anti-dilution
45. See id. § 24:68; see also Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales,
U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1035 (2d Cir. 1989) (Sweet, J., concurring) (articu-
lating a six-part analysis for determining the likelihood of dilution caused by
blurring: "(1) similarity of the marks; (2) similarity of the products covered by
the marks; (3) sophistication of consumers; (4) predatory intent; (5) renown of
the senior mark; and (6) renown of the junior mark").
46. See Mead Data Cent., Inc., 875 F.2d at 1031 (discussing the legislative
history of New York's anti-dilution statute).
47. See MCCARTHY, supra note 37, § 24:104 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 cmt. g (1995)) ("To prove a case of tarnishment,
the prior user must demonstrate that the subsequent use is likely to come to the
attention of the prior user's prospective purchasers and that the use is likely to
undermine or damage the positive associations evoked by the mark.").
48. Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that
the defendant diluted the plaintiffs trademark by making the deer look timid
and weak in an advertisement).
49. See id. at 41.
50. See id. at 45.
51. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 cmt. c (1995).




statute.13  Other states began to create anti-dilution laws to
protect against the use of one's trademark by another on non-
competing, unrelated goods.54  These laws protected trade-
mark owners against the gradual weakening of the identity of
their trademark rather than against consumer confusion.55
2. Federal Anti-Dilution Law
In 1995 only twenty-five states had state anti-dilution
laws but famous marks were ordinarily used nationwide;
therefore, Congress decided to create a federal dilution stat-
ute." The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (FTDA)
protects only "famous" marks57 and provides guidelines 5 to
determine whether a mark is "famous." The FTDA expands
the Lanham Act 5 with the addition of subsection (c) to section
43 of the Act 6° and the definition of dilution to section 45 of
53. See Robert N. Kleiger, Trademark Dilution: The Wtnttling Away of the
Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789, 811 (1997)
(citing Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946, ch. 307, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1129 (2004))) (The law provides that the "like-
lihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality of
a trade name or trade-mark shall be a ground for injunctive relief... notwith-
standing the absence of competition between the parties or of confusion as to
the source of goods or services.").
54. See Pearson, supra note 2, at 986.
55. See Schechter, supra note 40, at 825.
56. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 1127. Dilution is defined as "the lessening of the capacity of
a famous mark.. . ." Id. § 1125(c).
58. See id. § 1125(c).
In determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous, a court may
consider factors such as, but not limited to - (A) the degree of inherent
or acquired distinctiveness of the mark; (B) the duration and extent of
use of the mark in connection with the goods or services with which the
mark is used, (C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity
of the mark; (D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which
the mark is used; (E) the channels of trade for the goods or services
with which the mark is used; (F) the degree of recognition of the mark
in the trading areas and channels of trade used by the marks' owner
and the person against whom the injunction is sought; (G) the nature
and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties; and (H)
whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or
the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
Id
59. Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1129 (2001)).
60. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (granting remedies, such as injunction, for dilution
of the distinctive quality of famous marks).
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the Act.6 According to the report by the House of Represen-
tatives, the amendment was meant to protect famous trade-
marks from subsequent uses that blur or tarnish the distinct-
iveness of the mark, even without a likelihood of confusion.62
The FTDA allows a cause of action for "commercial use in
commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after
the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the dis-
tinctive quality of the mark."6 To establish dilution, the
trademark owner needs to show "actual dilution, rather than
a likelihood of dilution."' Although the bill originally re-
quired the mark to be registered, the Patent and Trademark
Office argued that, in order to maintain the United States'
position with its trading partners, famous marks needed pro-
tection regardless of whether the marks were registered in
the country where protection was sought.65 The FTDA pro-
vides injunctive relief to successful plaintiffs and monetary
relief only if the defendant "willfully intended to trade on the
owner's reputation or to cause dilution of the famous mark."
66
The FTDA also provides for defenses against an action of
dilution that include non-commercial use of the trademark,67
news reporting and commentary,' fair use through compara-
tive advertising,69 and federal registration of a trademark. ' °
Although a parody exception is not expressly listed in the de-
fenses for dilution,7' courts often include freedom of expres-
sion as a dilution defense as part of the "non-commercial use"
defense of section 43(c)(4)(B) of the Lanham Act.7
C. The First Amendment as a Defense
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
61. Id. § 1127.
62. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 2-3 (1995).
63. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
64. Moseley v. V. Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 433 (2003).
65. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 4 (1995).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2).
67. Id. § 1125(c)(4)(B).
68. Id. § 1125(c)(4)(C).
69. Id. § 1125(c)(4)(A).
70. Id. § 1125(c)(3).
71. Id. § 1125(c).
72. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(B); see also L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers,
Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 27 (1st Cir. 1987) (involving a defendant who tried to publish
a magazine with a non-commercial parody of the plaintiffs trademark).
1186 Vol: 44
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Consumer Council, Inc.,3 the Supreme Court recognized that
the First Amendment 4 offers protection to commercial
speech.7 The Supreme Court suggested that prior to this
1976 decision, the First Amendment did not protect commer-
cial speech."8 Since the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy de-
cision, defendants have successfully raised the First Amend-
ment defense for the unauthorized use of trademarks in
17parodies that do not confuse consumers.
The type of speech determines the amount of First
Amendment protection given to those who use another's
trademark."8 With the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy de-
cision, the Supreme Court provided a First Amendment de-
fense for commercial speech;" the Court then restricted this
defense in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission of New York." The Court limited this
First Amendment protection such that commercial speech
concerning an unlawful or misleading activity is not protected
by the First Amendment.8' States can even ban truthful, non-
misleading commercial speech to protect the public from re-
sponding "irrationally" to the truth." Sometimes the type of
73. 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (involving a Virginia statute that prohibited li-
censed pharmacists from advertising prescription drug prices).
74. U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an es-
tablishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assem-
ble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id.
75. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765 (holding that advertising of
commercial products deserves the same constitutional protection as political
speech or writing). Commercial speech is defined as speech that "involves only
the commercial interests of the speaker and the audience, and is therefore af-
forded lesser First Amendment protection than social, political, or religious
speech." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1407 (7th ed. 2000).
76. Id. at 758. "There can be no question that in past decisions the Court
has given some indication that commercial speech is unprotected." Id.
77. See Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g. Group, Inc., 886
F.2d 490, 495 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that the defendant could parody Cliffs
Notes based on the First Amendment); see also discussion infra Part II.E.2.
78. See MCCARTHY, supra note 37, § 31:37 (distinguishing commercial
speech from other speech).
79. Va. State Bd. ofPharmacy, 425 U.S. at 748.
80. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
81. Id. at 566. "For commercial speech to come with that provision [First
Amendment], it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading." Id.
82. Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1977). "If dis-
semination of this information ['For Sale' signs] can be restricted, then every
locality in the country can suppress any facts that reflect poorly on the locality,
so long as a plausible claim can be made that disclosure would cause the recipi-
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speech is not readily discernible. For example, when com-
mercial speech and fully protected speech are "inextricably
intertwined," the Supreme Court considers the total mix as
non-commercial, fully protected speech." Because advertise-
ments contain both social and commercial value, courts may
differ when categorizing speech as commercial or non-
commercial.84
In trademark infringement and dilution cases, defen-
dants have successfully invoked the protection of the First
Amendment by alleging that the use of the plaintiffs trade-
mark was meant to convey an important social or commercial
message to the public.8 5 The use of another's trademark in a
parody often lies within the constitutional protection given to
non-commercial speech and thus may be subject to liability
only in the most narrow circumstances." If a defendant uses
another's trademark in a commercial context, then a First
Amendment defense is usually rejected. 7 For example, in
Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. v. Novak,"8 the defendant
conveyed a message of protest against nuclear weapons by
marketing products bearing the phrase "Mutant of Omaha."
Because other non-commercial alternatives existed to express
the message without using the plaintiffs trademark, the
court rejected the defendant's First Amendment defense.
D. The Definition of Parody
A parody is "a writing in which the language and style of
ents of the information to act 'irrationally.'" Id. But see Va. State Bd. of Phar-
macy, 425 U.S. at 770 (denying the government such sweeping powers).
83. Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988).
"[W]here, as here, the component parts of a single speech are inextricably inter-
twined, we cannot parcel out the speech, applying one test to one phrase and
another test to another phrase. Such an endeavor would be both artificial and
impractical. Therefore, we apply our test for fully protected speech." Id.; see
also McCarthy, supra note 37, § 31:141.
84. See discussion infra Part IV.B.3.
85. See MCCARTHY, supra note 37, § 31:144 (discussing the use of someone
else's trademark to convey a message).
86. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 cmt. i (1995).
87. See MCCARTHY, supra note 37, § 31:144.
88. 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987).
89. Id. at 398.
90. Id. at 402. "Other avenues for Novak to express his views exist and are
unrestricted by the injunction; for example, it in no way infringes upon the con-
stitutional protection the First Amendment would provide were Novak to pre-
sent an editorial parody in a book, magazine, or film." Id.
TRADEMARKPARODY
an author or work is closely imitated for comic effect or in
ridicule often with certain peculiarities greatly heightened or
exaggerated."'" An effective parody "must convey two simul-
taneous-and contradictory-messages: that it is the original,
but also that it is not the original and is instead a parody."9
Parody is used as a defense when defendants poke fun at
a plaintiffs trademark.9' For example, in L.L. Bean, Inc. v.
Drake Publishers, Inc.,' the defendant published a magazine
article displaying the L.L. Bean trademark along with sexu-
ally explicit pictures and claimed parody as a defense to the
infringement claim.9' The court held that enjoining the publi-
cation of the parody would violate the First Amendment
guarantees of freedom of expression.96
The amount of First Amendment protection granted to
parodies is still unsettled by the courts.97 Public policy con-
siderations deem important both the protection of the right to
parody another's trademark and the protection of one's
trademark investment and good will.9" As a result, courts
tend to be more critical of parodies that are used to sell a
competitive product and less critical of parodies that are used
solely for entertainment or social criticism.99
Historically, trademark law has prohibited any use of a
trademark that would harm the trademark's good will. 100
Furthermore, trademark law provides remedies for the unau-
91. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 1643 (3d ed. 1993).
92. Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d
490, 494 (2d Cir. 1989); see also People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v.
Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 364 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that the defendant's use of
PETA's mark in its domain name did not constitute a parody because the mes-
sages, the famous PETA name and Doughney's "People Eating Tasty Animals"
web site, were not conveyed simultaneously, and thus consumers could not de-
termine that PETA was not associated with the defendant's web site until after
arriving at the web site).
93. SeeKane, supra note 5, § 12:1.3.
94. 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987).
95. Id. at 27.
96. Id. at 34 (stating that "[d]enying parodists the opportunity to poke fun
at symbols and names which have become woven into the fabric of our daily life,
would constitute a serious curtailment of a protected form of expression").
97. See Pearson, supra note 2, at 999.
98. SeeKane, supra note 5, § 12:1.3.
99. See id.
100. See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604
F.2d 200, 205 (2d Cir. 1979) (quoting Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346
F. Supp. 1183, 1189 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)).
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thorized commercial use of a trademark that results in in-
jury.' The parody defense is used in a variety of causes of
action, such as the right of publicity (an intellectual property
cause of action) and defamation (a tort cause of action).10 2
However, this comment will only examine parody under intel-
lectual property laws, specifically trademark infringement
and dilution.
E. Parody and Trademark Infingemen 3
The Second Circuit has unambiguously acknowledged a
parody defense for trademark infringement." Although this
comment refers to parody as a defense to trademark in-
fringement, 5 courts do not treat parody as a separate defense
but rather as a response to the likelihood of confusion ration-
ale. 06
When a direct competitor uses the trademark owner's
mark, courts may frequently find a likelihood of confusion. 7
For instance, in Wendy's International, Inc. v. Big Bite,
Inc.,1°' the court enjoined the use of the Wendy's mascot of a
young girl with red pigtails in an advertisement by a compet-
ing restaurant. 9 However, parody is an irrelevant factor in a
101. See L.L. Bean, Inc., 811 F.2d at 29 (citing Lucasfilm, Ltd. v. High Fron-
tier, 622 F. Supp. 931, 933-35 (D.D.C. 1985) (finding that a trademark owner's
rights extends only to injurious, unauthorized commercial uses of the mark by
another)).
102. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 cmt. i (1995);
see also Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2002);
Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1183 (9th Cir. 2001).
103. See discussion supra Part II.A.3.
104. See Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 737 F. Supp. 826, 833
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (stating that "[t]he Second Circuit recognizes parody as a de-
fense to a Lanham Act claim").
105. See discussion infra Part V.
106. See MCCARTHY, supra note 37, § 31:153; see also Elvis Presley Enters.,
Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 198 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating that parody is not a
"defense," but another factor to be weighed in the likelihood of confusion analy-
sis for trademark infringement); Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA,
Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1405 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that parody is not a separate
"defense," but is merely a way of phrasing the traditional response that there is
no likelihood of confusion).
107. SeeKane, supra note 5, § 12:1.3.
108. 576 F. Supp. 816 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
109. See id. at 824 (explaining that because the parties are in direct competi-
tion, there is a greater likelihood of confusion). "If Big Bite were parodying the
Little Wendy character in an effort to sell used cars, then it would be more diffi-
cult to find a likelihood of confusion since used cars are not substitutes for ham-
burgers ...." Id.
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likelihood of confusion analysis if the target of the parody is
not the trademark itself but some other concept."" For in-
stance, in Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P v. Penguin Books USA,
Inc.,"' the defendant's use of the Dr. Seuss trademark in a
book title was meant only to get attention rather than to
mock the substance or style of The Cat in the Hat! books and
thus received no First Amendment protection.1
2
1. Parodies Found Likely to Cause Confusion
Courts find that some parodies cause "confusion" when
the consumer may believe the trademark owner authorized a
third party to parody the protected work. In the following
cases, the courts held that the parodies were likely to cause
consumer confusion.
In Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. v. Novak,"3 Novak
sold t-shirts, caps, buttons, and mugs that mocked Mutual of
Omaha in order to protest nuclear arms."' The Eighth Cir-
cuit upheld the injunction against Novak's continued sale of
goods containing the words "Mutant of Omaha" and bearing
symbols with a likeness to the plaintiffs Indian head logo be-
cause of the likelihood of confusion between Mutual of
Omaha's trademarks and Novak's designs." 5
In Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications,"6 the
defendants published the humor magazine Snicker and
placed a fictitious advertisement for "Michelob Oily" on the
back cover to protest toxic dumping.1 7 The accompanying
graphics of the advertisement included several of Anheuser-
Busch's protected trademarks such as the Michelob name and
slogan.'18 The advertisement contained the words, "One Taste
and You'll Drink It Oily," which parodied Michelob Dry's "One
Taste and You'll Drink It Dry" slogan."9 Upon weighing the
public interest in protecting Balducci's expression against the
public interest in avoiding consumer confusion, the Eighth
110. See MCCARTHY, supra note 37, § 31:153.
111. 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).
112. Id. at 1401.
113. 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987).
114. Id. at 398.
115. Id. at 398, 403.
116. 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994).
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Circuit held that the parody was likely to confuse consumers
and that Balducci could have conveyed its message in an al-
ternative, less-confusing manner. 120
In Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Books USA,
Inc.,1 the Ninth Circuit determined whether the defendant's
poetic summary of the O.J. Simpson double murder trial enti-
tled The Cat NOT in the Hat!A Parody by Dr. Juice infringed
the trademarks of Dr. Seuss.22 Because the court found a
likelihood of confusion and a balance of hardships favoring
Seuss, the court enjoined Penguin from the use of the Seuss
trademarks.123
2. Parodies Found Not Likely to Cause Confusion
In Jordache Enterprises v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd.,24 the defen-
dant marketed its blue jeans for larger women with a smiling
pig and the word "Lardashe" on the seat of the pants to par-
ody the famous Jordache label."5 Because Lardashe used a
humorous and brightly colored design while Jordache had a
more subtle label, the Tenth Circuit determined that these
obvious differences greatly outweighed any similarities be-
tween the marks.
126
In Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publish-
ing Group, Inc., 27 the defendant published Spy Notes as a
parody of a condensation of urban novels depicting drug
abuse in the 1980s to mimic the Cliffs Notes study guides. 2 '
Although the cover of Spy Notes used some of the identical
aspects of the Cliffs Notes cover design, the Second Circuit
vacated the injunction against the defendant because the
public interest in free expression outweighed any slight risk
of consumer confusion, especially when a parody must to
some extent resemble the original.'29
120. Id. at 776-77 (stating that "using an obvious disclaimer, positioning the
parody in a less-confusing location, altering the protected marks in a meaning-
ful way, or doing some collection of the above, Balducci could have conveyed its
message with substantially less risk of consumer confusion").
121. 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).
122. Id. at 1396.
123. Id. at 1406.
124. 828 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 1987).
125. Id. at 1483.
126. See id. at 1485.
127. 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989).
128. Id. at 492.
129. Id at 497 (holding that "the district court erred as a matter of law in
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In Lyons Partnership v. Giannoulas,"° the defendant,
creator of The Famous Chicken sports mascot, used the plain-
tiff's Barney trademark in his act in which the Chicken as-
saulted Barney.13 The Fifth Circuit found that the use of the
Barney trademark was clearly a parody, particularly because
the strength of the Barney mark may have helped the con-
sumers to recognize the joke easily.132
In New York Stock Exchange, Inc. v. New York, New
York Hotel, LLC, 33 the defendants developed a Las Vegas ca-
sino that used modified versions of NYSE's marks to adhere
to its New York theme."M  Upon a "Polaroid" analysis, 13' the
Second Circuit concluded that the "obvious pun" would not
cause any confusion among consumers."'
In Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc.,37 Mattel sued the
defendants for producing and selling a song that parodied its
famous Barbie doll.' 3' The Ninth Circuit held that the song
about Barbie did not infringe Mattel's trademark because the
song did not mislead consumers as to the source or suggest
any association with Mattel.
3 9
F Parody and Trademark Dilution
The parody defense also applies to trademark dilution ac-
tions. 4 ° Use of a trademark in a parody is often unlikely to
cause the dilution of the mark's distinctiveness because the
use of the mark in the parody refers back to the trademark
concluding ... that there was a strong likelihood of confusion").
130. 179 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 1999).
131. Seeid. at 385, 387.
132. See id. at 388. "When, as here, a parody makes a specific, ubiquitous
trademark the brunt of its joke, the use of the trademark for satirical purposes
affects our analysis of the factors to consider when determining whether the use
is likely to result in consumer confusion." Id. at 390.
133. 293 F.3d 550 (2d Cir. 2002).
134. See id. at 553.
135. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
136. NYS.E., Inc., 293 F.3d at 555.
137. 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002).
138. Id. at 899.
139. Id. at 902. "The song title does not explicitly mislead as to the source of
the work; it does not, explicitly or otherwise, suggest that it was produced by
Mattel." Id.
140. See L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 28 (1st Cir.
1987). "[P]arody inevitably conflicts with one of the underlying purposes of
the ... anti-dilution statute, which is to protect against the tarnishment of the
goodwill and reputation associated with a particular trademark." Id.
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owner."' However, the use of the mark can still be dilutive as
long as the distinctiveness of the mark is diminished when
the mark no longer conjures up only the senior user.141
Although vulnerable to a dilution attack, parodies can
withstand tarnishment of a famous mark.' Tarnishment
caused merely by an editorial or artistic parody in a non-
commercial context receives the free speech protections of the
First Amendment and thus is not actionable under an anti-
dilution statute.'" In fact, an editorial, non-commercial par-
ody that causes tarnishment receives the greatest amount of
First Amendment protection, 45 but that protection decreases
if the trademark is used in a commercial context.4 ' According
to the Restatement of Unfair Competition, non-trademark
uses that "comment on, criticize, ridicule, parody or dispar-
age" a trademark are exempt from anti-dilution statutes. 41
141. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 cmt. f (1995).
142. See Mattel Inc., 296 F.3d at 903-04. MCA's use of Mattel's mark exem-
plifies a "blurring" type of dilution. After the song about Barbie became popu-
lar, consumers are likely to think of both the doll and the song or maybe just the
song upon hearing Barbie's name. Id.
143. See Kane, supra note 5, § 12:1.3.
144. See L.L. Bean, Inc., 811 F.2d at 33.
If the anti-dilution statute were construed as permitting a trademark
owner to enjoin the use of his mark in a noncommercial context found
to be negative or offensive, then a corporation could shield itself from
criticism by forbidding the use of its name in commentaries critical of
its conduct.... The Constitution does not, however, permit the range
of the anti-dilution statute to encompass the unauthorized use of a
trademark in a noncommercial setting such as an editorial or artistic
context.
Id.
145. See Jordache Enters. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1490 n.7 (10th
Cir. 1987) (stating that "[t]he tension between the first amendment and trade-
mark rights is most acute when a noncommercial parody is alleged to have
caused tarnishment, a situation in which first amendment protection is great-
est").
146. See id. at 1489-90 (holding that the use of Lardashe as a parody of Jor-
dache for pants does not constitute dilution because a commercial parody "tends
to increase public identification of a plaintiffs mark with the plaintiff" and does
not create an unwholesome or tarnishing image).
147. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25(2) (1995). Uses of
a mark "to comment on, criticize, ridicule, parody, or disparage... is subject to
liability without proof of a likelihood of confusion only if the actor's conduct
meets the requirements of a cause of action for defamation, invasion of privacy,
or injurious falsehood." Id. There is no mention of dilution. An "extension of
the antidilution statutes to protect against damaging nontrademark uses raises
substantial free speech issues and duplicates other potential remedies better
suited to balance the relevant interests." Id. at cmt. i.
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The unauthorized use of trademarks in parodies "risk some
dilution of the identifying or selling power of the mark, but
that risk is generally tolerated in the interest of maintaining
broad opportunities for expression.' 4
1. Parodies Found Likely to Cause Dilution
In Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cin-
ema, Ltd.,4 9 the Second Circuit held that the actress some-
times clad in a Dallas Cowboys Cheerleader uniform in an X-
rated film diluted the reputation of the plaintiff."' Because
the uniform depicted in the film undeniably brought to mind
the Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders, consumers who saw the film
likely would not be able to disassociate it from the plaintiffs
cheerleaders.' Furthermore, the injunction did not encroach
upon the defendant's First Amendment rights because alter-
native methods existed to comment on sexuality and athleti-
cism."2
Similarly, in Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Products, Inc.,"'
the defendant published Screw magazine with a picture of
figures resembling the plaintiffs trade characters "Poppin
Fresh" and "Poppie Fresh" in lewd poses."' The court found
that the defendants' unauthorized use of the trademark in a
negative manner could injure the plaintiffs business reputa-
tion or dilute the distinctive quality of its trademarks."'
In Deere & Co. v. MTD Products, Inc.,"' the defendant
created a commercial for its lawn tractor that depicted an
animated deer simulating the John Deere logo running away
from its lawn tractor in fear." ' The Second Circuit found di-
lution because the defendant significantly altered the Deere
logo such that consumers would associate the trademark with
inferior goods.''
148. Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 44 (2d Cir. 1994).
149. 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979).
150. Id. at 202.
151. Id. at 205 (stating that this association tends to hold plaintiffs responsi-
ble for such an offensive film and injure its business reputation).
152. Id. at 206.
153. 215 U.S.P.Q. 124 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
154. Id. at 125-26.
155. Id. at 135.
156. 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994).
157. Id. at 41.
158. Id. at 45.
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2. Parodies Found Not Likely to Cause Dilution
In Jordache Enterprises v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd,59 Jordache
also raised a claim under New Mexico's anti-dilution stat-
ute.6 ' Although the Lardashe, large-size designer jeans, may
have been in poor taste, the continued existence of Lardashe
jeans would not cause Jordache to lose its distinctiveness as a
strong trademark or create in the mind of consumers a par-
ticularly unwholesome association with the Jordache mark.'
In Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Products, Inc.,6'
Jim Henson created a wild boar Muppet character named
SPA'AM to parody Hormel's SPAM meat products. 16' The
Second Circuit found no blurring because the dissimilarity of
the marks in the parody would not weaken the association be-
tween the SPAM trademark and Hormel's lunch meat."M Fur-
thermore, the court found no dilution under a tarnishment
theory because Henson's likeable and positive SPA'AM char-
acter would not create any negative associations with Hor-
mel. 1
65
In L.L. Bean Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc.,'6 6 the defen-
dant published an article depicting L.L. Bean's catalog
trademark with sexually explicit pictures. 167 Although the de-
fendant used L.L. Bean's trademark in a negative or offensive
context, the First Circuit permitted the unauthorized use in a
non-commercial setting.'
III. THE PROBLEM WITH INCONSISTENCY
The preceding discussion illustrates that courts have
159. 828 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 1987).
160. Id. at 1488.
161. See id. at 1490. Likewise, in the context of copyright parody, the Su-
preme Court has held that "[t]he threshold question when fair use is raised in
defense of parody is whether a parodic character may reasonably be perceived.
Whether, going beyond that, parody is in good taste or bad does not and should
not matter to fair use." Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 582,
594 (1994) (holding that the commercial character of the rap music group 2 Live
Crew's parody of the copyrighted song, "Oh, Pretty Woman," did not create a
presumption against copyright fair use); see also 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 107 (2003).
162. 73 F.3d 497 (2d Cir. 1996).
163. Id. at 500.
164. See id. at 506.
165. See id. at 507.
166. 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987).
167. See id. at 27.
168. See id. at 33.
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ruled inconsistently on trademark cases involving parody. 169
Consequently, this conflict among the courts demonstrates
the need for a set of rules on how to approach trademark in-
fringement and dilution cases such that trademark protection
is balanced with free expression rights of the First Amend-
ment.
Although courts have followed a "Polaroid"7 ' type of
analysis to determine whether use constitutes trademark in-
fringement, they have failed to devise a clear rule to deter-
mine when a parody that may cause a likelihood of confusion
merits First Amendment protection. 17' Moreover, because the
FTDA is unclear on First Amendment defenses, 2 courts are
left to develop their own approach to apply free speech rights
to trademark dilution.
73
There must be a uniform method to determine when a
parody becomes actionable under trademark laws and when
it serves as a defense under the First Amendment.7 7 By
examining case history, this comment suggests an approach
that balances a trademark owner's rights with a parodist's
right to freedom of speech.
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF CIRCUIT COURT DECISIONS
Some parts of this analysis naturally will fall under the
category of trademark infringement, such as avoiding con-
sumer confusion, while others will fall under trademark dilu-
tion, like altering the mark, portraying the mark in an un-
wholesome manner, or competing versus non-competing
products. Still another part of the analysis will encompass
both infringement and dilution. For instance, infringement
and dilution should be considered simultaneously for a dis-
cussion of alternatives to parody.
169. See discussion supra Part II.E-F.
170. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
171. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ'ns, 28 F.3d 769, 776 (8th Cir.
1994). "There is no simple, mechanical rule by which courts can determine
when a potentially confusing parody falls within the First Amendment's protec-
tive reach." Id.
172. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2004). A parody exception is not expressly stated
as a defense to dilution. See also discussion supra Part II.B.
173. See Levy, supra note 22, at 435.
174. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002)
(stating that if we "ignore the expressive value that some marks assume,
trademark rights would grow to encroach upon the zone protected by the First
Amendment").
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This analysis will review previous trademark parody
cases to demonstrate the contradictions among decisions from
different courts.
A. Approaches to Trademark Infringement
During the 1989 revision of the Lanham Act, Congress
expressly included trademark protection against confusion as
to "origin, sponsorship, or approval."'75 However, because the
"keystone of parody is imitation,"7 ' courts have tolerated
somewhat more risk of confusion for cases involving parody. 7
1. The Balancing Approach
The first approach used by courts involves balancing two
competing considerations: allowing free expression and avoid-
ing or at least reducing consumer confusion. In fact, a likeli-
hood of confusion analysis usually helps to balance the
trademark owner's property rights and the public's interest in
free expression."'
The satiric Spy Notes book in Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantum
Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc.'79 imitated Cliffs
Notes' distinctive yellow and black cover."O But the Spy
Notes parody also contained important differences such as
the words "A Satire" appearing fives times in red lettering
and an illustration of New York City instead of the Cliff
Notes mountain illustration.'
In overturning the district court's grant of a preliminary
injunction, the Second Circuit followed the proposition that
the First Amendment protects parody, a form of artistic ex-
pression.'82 The court followed a balancing approach that was
first introduced in Rogers v. Grimaldi8 in which the Lanham
175. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
176. Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d
490, 494 (2d Cir. 1989).
177. See id. at 495; see also discussion supra Part II.E.2.
178. See Mattel, Inc., 296 F.3d at 900.
179. Cliffs Notes, Inc., 886 F.2d 490.
180. Id. at 492.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 493; see also Silverman v. CBS Inc., 870 F.2d 40, 49 (2d Cir. 1989)
(stating that "trademark protection is not lost simply because the allegedly in-
fringing use is in connection with a work of artistic expression"). In this case
Silverman attempted to develop a Broadway musical based on CBS's "Amos 'n'
Andy" characters. Id at 42.
183. 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989). In Rogers v. Grimaldi, actress Ginger
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Act was construed narrowly to avoid conflicts with the First
Amendment."+ The Rogers court held that "the Act should be
construed to apply to artistic works only where the public in-
terest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the public
interest in free expression."'
In Cliffs Notes the court held that the balancing ap-
proach generally applies to Lanham Act claims against works
of artistic expression such as parody.'86 Furthermore, "a bal-
ancing approach allows greater latitude for works such as
parodies, in which expression, and not commercial exploita-
tion of another's trademark, is the primary intent, and in
which there is a need to evoke the original work being paro-
died."18 ' Thus, the public interest in parody outweighed the
degree of risk of consumer confusion between the Spy Notes
parody and Cliffs Notes.8'
2. Likelihood of Confusion First, then Balancing
Approach
A second approach to trademark infringement also
weighs free speech with trademark laws, but first considers
whether the parody is likely to cause consumer confusion.'89
This approach differs from Cliffs Notes, in which the Second
Circuit used the First Amendment to rule out a likelihood of
confusion without addressing the confusion factors.'
In Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications,' the
Eighth Circuit first performed a likelihood of confusion analy-
Rogers claimed that a title of the Italian film Ginger and Fred confused con-
sumers as to the source by creating a false notion that she was associated with
the film. Id. at 999. However, the Second Circuit ruled that the Lanham Act
provided no protection to this artistic work because in this instance, the public
interest in free expression outweighed the public interest in avoiding consumer
confusion. Id. Note that this is how the balancing approach developed in the
Second Circuit. Other circuits also used a balancing approach. For example in
Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 775 F.2d 247 (8th Cir. 1985), the Eighth
Circuit first determined a likelihood of confusion and then balanced the First
Amendment with the Lanham Act to determine that the defendant's use consti-
tuted trademark infringement. Id. at 249.
184. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 998.
185. Id. at 999.
186. Cliffs Notes, Inc., 886 F.2d at 495.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 495.
189. See Perez, supra note 19, at 1481.
190. See Cliffs Notes, Inc., 886 F.2d at 497.
191. 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994).
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sis to Balducci's parody before considering First Amendment
protection.19 After finding a strong likelihood of confusion,
the court quickly dismissed any parody defense because
Balducci's advertisement conveyed that it was the original
Anheuser-Busch rather than an imitation.
193
The Ninth Circuit also considered the likelihood of confu-
sion factors before applying a Rogers ' type of balancing to
Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc.95 The court held that the
defendant's Barbie Girl song did not infringe Mattel's trade-
mark because the use of the Barbie mark was artistically
relevant to the song, and the title did not explicitly mislead
consumers as to the source.
196
3. Apply Just the Lanham Act to Parody
A third approach to trademark infringement ignores the
balancing approaches and simply considers the likelihood of
confusion caused by a parody. In other words, true parody
may be protected by simply applying the Lanham Act.'97 This
approach looks to the intent of the unauthorized use of an-
other's trademark. Where one chooses a mark as a parody of
an existing mark, the intent to parody does not necessarily in-
fer an intent to confuse the public but rather to amuse the
public. 19
192. Id. at 773. On appeal the Eighth Circuit determined that the district
court erred because instead of "first considering whether Balducci's ad parody
was likely to confuse the public and then considering the scope of First Amend-
ment protection, the district court conflated the two." Id.
193. Id. at 777. "Balducci's ad, developed through the nearly unaltered ap-
propriation of Anheuser-Busch's marks, conveys that it is the original, but the
ad founders on its failure to convey that it is not the original. Thus, it is vul-
nerable under trademark law since the customer is likely to be confused...."
Id.; see also discussion supra Part II.D. (defining parody).
194. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
195. 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v.
Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1404-05 (9th Cir. 1997) (applying the
same test).
196. Mattel, Inc. 296 F.3d at 902; see also Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999 (holding
that literary titles do not violate the Lanham Act "unless the title has no artistic
relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic rele-
vance, unless the title explicitly misleads as to the source or the content of the
work").
197. See Perez, supra note 19, at 1482.
198. See Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1486 (10th
Cir. 1987). Under copyright law, parody refers to the use of some elements of a
prior author's work to create a new work that, to some extent, comments on the
original author's work. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S.
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In Lyons Partnership v. Giannoulas,'99 the Fifth Circuit
first determined that the defendant's humorous act was
meant to parody the Barney character and then considered
the likelihood of confusion."'0 The court held that the use of a
trademark for parody affects the analysis of the likelihood of
confusion factors such that the parodic nature of the use of
the mark cannot be separated from the confusion analysis."0 '
Likewise, in New York Stock Exchange, Inc. v. New York,
New York Hotel, LLC, °20 the Second Circuit only evaluated
the Lanham Act's likelihood of confusion factors to determine
that the defendant's "obvious pun" of a New York-themed ca-
sino did not infringe upon the trademark rights of the
NYSE." 3 The court found unlikely that consumers would
misunderstand the casino's attempt at a humorous theme, °
especially because humorous parody "depends on a lack of
confusion to make its point."0 '
In Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd.,"6 the
Tenth Circuit simply incorporated the intent to parody into
the likelihood of confusion factors.0 7 The court found that the
defendants adopted the "Lardashe" mark with the intent to
parody rather than to confuse the public.0 8
Under certain circumstances, this approach allows the
parties to avoid trial °.2  By considering the defendant's con-
duct as a parody while evaluating a likelihood of confusion, a
court may award summary judgment if there is overwhelming
evidence of a parody that does not confuse.' 0 Thus, even if
some of the factors weigh in favor of the plaintiff for a likeli-
569, 580 (1994); see also 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 107 (2004).
199. 179 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 1999).
200. Id. at 389.
201. Id. at 390.
202. 293 F.3d 550 (2d Cir. 2002).
203. Id. at 555-56.
204. Id. at 556.
205. Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 503 (2d
Cir. 1996).
206. 828 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 1987).
207. Id. at 1485.
208. Id at 1486-87. Under Campbell, the Supreme Court determined that
the intent to use a parody for commercial gain does not create a presumption
against fair use; the question is whether someone can reasonably perceive the
parodic character of the copyrighted work. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,
510 U.S. 569, 582-84 (1994).
209. See Lyons P'ship v. Giannoulas, 179 F.3d 384, 389 (5th Cir. 1999).
210. Seeid.
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hood of confusion, these factors can be outweighed by parody,
when treated as an additional factor in the likelihood of con-
fusion analysis.21'
Although this approach seems to allow trademark in-
fringement for the sake of parody, not every parody is auto-
matically exempt from the traditional laws of trademark.212
Despite the intent to create a parody, a likelihood of confusion
can still exist.2" However, this approach seems to suppress
any notions that parody simply ignores trademark law by fo-
cusing on the intent of parody. For instance, Giannoulas used
parody to highlight the differences between Barney and The
Famous Chicken rather than to confuse his audience.24
Moreover, "[a] parody relies upon a difference from the origi-
nal mark, presumably a humorous difference, in order to pro-
duce its desired effect.
21 5
B. Approaches to Trademark Dilution
Unlike the trademark infringement analysis, which fo-
cuses upon how to apply a parody defense to the Lanham Act,
the trademark dilution analysis centers on when to apply di-
lution law. This dilution analysis compares how the courts
handle parodies that may blur or tarnish the trademark.
Anti-dilution statutes stemmed from the void left by
trademark infringement laws. 6 Unlike trademark infringe-
ment, dilution does not require a likelihood of confusion2 7 and
thus follows a different analysis. The dilution theory protects
famous trademarks, even in the absence of a likelihood of con-
fusion, if the use diminishes the strong identification value of
the mark.1
1. Alteration of the Trademark for Parody
Dilution by "blurring" can occur when the use or modifi-
211. See id.
212. See MCCARTHY, supra note 37, § 31:153. "Some parodies will constitute
an infringement, some will not. But the cry of 'parody!' does not magically fend
off otherwise legitimate claims of trademark infringement or dilution." Id.
213. Jordache Enters., Inc., 828 F.2d at 1486.
214. See Lyons P'ship, 179 F.3d at 386-87.
215. Jordache Enters., Inc., 828 F.2d at 1486.
216. See L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 30 (lst Cir.
1987).
217. See discussion supra Part II.B.
218. See MCCARTHY, supra note 37, § 24:70.
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cation of another's mark results in the mark losing its ability
to serve as a unique identifier.219 Dilution by "tarnishment"
can occur when the mark is "linked to products of shoddy
quality, or is portrayed in an unwholesome or unsavory con-
text," such that "the public will associate the lack of quality or
lack of prestige in the defendant's goods with the plaintiffs
unrelated goods."22° The risk of some dilution of the identify-
ing ability of a mark is generally tolerated in the public inter-
est of maintaining opportunities for free speech.22'
In Deere & Company v. MTD Products, Inc.,222 the Second
Circuit enjoined MTD from altering Deere's logo to advertise
its claimed product superiority.23 The court reasoned that al-
though not every alteration of a trademark will constitute di-
lution, the amount of dilution protection given must corre-
spond to the degree and nature of the alteration.
224
Conversely, in Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prod-
ucts, Inc., 5 the Second Circuit found no likelihood of dilution
because Henson's use would not result in negative associa-
tions to Hormel's mark.2" The court came to this conclusion
because unlike the situation in Deere & Co., Henson was not
seeking to modify the SPAM mark to sell more of its competi-
tive product.227 In fact, Henson and Hormel were not in direct
competition.
2 1
2. Trademark Parodies that Offend
Tarnishment results when the unauthorized use of a
trademark degrades any positive associations of the mark
and lessens the distinctive quality of the trademark.229 Courts
have disagreed as to whether parodies that offend deserve
any freedom of speech protections of the First Amendment.
219. See Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994).
220. Id. at 43.
221. Seeid. at 44.
222. 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994).
223. Id at 45.
224. Id. According to the Campbell Court, copyright law would likely give
more protection to the parody due to the alteration. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580 n.14 (1994).
225. 73 F.3d 497 (2d Cir. 1996).
226. Id. at 508.
227. Id
228. Id.; see also discussion infra Part IV.B.3.
229. See MCCARTHY, supra note 37, § 24:104.
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In Pillsbury v. Milky Way Products,20 the court deemed
the offensive depiction of the plaintiffs trademark in sexually
explicit activities as actionable under state anti-dilution
law.23' Likewise, the Second Circuit found a parody depicting
a trademark in an offensive manner to be dilutive and harm-
ful to the trademark owner's reputation.2  Thus, in Dallas
Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd.,233 con-
sumers likely would not be able to disassociate the plaintiffs
trademarks from the defendant's pornographic movie. 34
Conversely, the First Circuit held that even offensive
trademark parodies convey a message.235 In L.L. Bean Inc. v.
Drake Publishers, Inc.,236 the court granted First Amendment
protection to the defendant's unauthorized use of the plain-
tiffs mark in an offensive context. 237 The First Circuit went
on to state that neither the limits of the First Amendment nor
the history of anti-dilution law allow a finding of tarnishment
based only on the presence of an unwholesome image.238 In
fact, tarnishment results when the consumers' ability to asso-
ciate the appropriate products to the trademark has dimin-
ished, not when the trademark simply has been used in an of-
239fensive manner.
The Tenth Circuit agreed that a mark can be tarnished
when used in an unwholesome context, but found that
"[p]rescisely what suffices as an unwholesome context is not
immediately evident."24" For instance, in Jordache Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd.,4 1 the court found that the
230. 215 U.S.P.Q. 124 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
231. Id. at 40-41.
232. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d
200, 205 (2d Cir. 1979).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 205.
235. See L.L. Bean, Inc., 811 F.2d at 34. "The message may be simply that
business and product images need not always be taken too seriously; a trade-
mark parody reminds us that we are free to laugh at the images and associa-
tions linked with the mark." Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 33.
238. Id. at 31.
239. Id. (finding that an application of an anti-dilution statute to a noncom-
mercial parody is offensive to the Constitution when regulated simply because
the use was in an "offensive" or "unwholesome" context).





parody of the Jordache jeans for larger-sized women may of-
fend some consumers but would not create an unwholesome
association with the Jordache name. 42  Likewise, the First
Circuit seemed to state in dicta that a determination of the
offensiveness or unwholesomeness of a trademark use would
inappropriately have to rely upon judicial evaluation.243
3. Commercial Versus Non-commercial Use
Although on its face the Federal Trademark Dilution Act
of 1995 is capable of application to competitive circum-
stances,2" the authorities are split as to whether the state
anti-dilution statutes apply when the parties are in direct
competition." The theory of anti-dilution was created to pro-
tect strong marks, from unauthorized use in markets far re-
moved from those in which the famous mark appears.4 6
However, in dicta, the Tenth Circuit stated that a state dilu-
tion statute cannot be limited to cases involving non-
competing products. 247  Likewise, the Restatement of Unfair
Competition takes the position that dilution can result in
competitive circumstances because some consumers may be
confused as to the source or affiliation and others may not.2"
The former group claims a likelihood of confusion and trade-
mark infringement, while the latter group claims dilution.
2 49
242. Id. at 1490.
243. See L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987)
(quoting United States v. Guarino, 729 F.2d 864, 867 (1st Cir. 1984)). The First
Amendment does not warrant inquiry into "measures of distress or offensive-
ness, depending on the reader, listener, or viewer." Id.
244. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2004) (defining dilution as applying to situations
regardless of the presence or absence of competition); see also McCarthy, supra
note 37, § 24:90 (stating that the federal anti-dilution act is not limited to the
traditional non-competitive situations when the concept of dilution was first ap-
plied).
245. See MCCARTHY, supra note 37, § 24:72.
246. See id. § 24:72.
247. See Jordache Enters., Inc., 828 F.2d at 1489. Based on the plain lan-
guage of the state anti-dilution statute that grants relief "notwithstanding the
absence of competition between the parties," the anti-dilution statute cannot be
limited to non-competing products. Id.
248. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 cmt. f (1995).
The Reporter's Notes state that when courts hold that state anti-dilution stat-
utes are not applicable for products in direct competition, "[t]hese cases offer no
explanation beyond the desire not to duplicate traditional trademark doctrines."
Id.
249. See MCCARTHY, supra note 37, § 24:90 (stating that a likelihood of con-
fusion and dilution may be alleged in the alternative).
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Drawing a line between commercial and non-commercial
parodies becomes especially difficult when a mark is parodied
for the dual purposes of making a parodic comment and sell-
ing a somewhat competing product.25 Some courts only
rarely or sparingly apply anti-dilution laws to cases involving
competitive parties.2"' The Second Circuit even proposes that
parodies in direct competition with the trademark should re-
ceive less First Amendment protection against a dilution
claim. 2  In Hormel Foods Corp.,"' the court found that be-
cause the defendant's product would not be in direct competi-
tion with that of the plaintiffs, the defendant's parody would
not dilute the plaintiffs mark.254 The Second Circuit further
noted that direct competition "is an important, even if not de-
terminative, factor."
255
In L.L. Bean, Inc.,256 the First Circuit stated that the
First Amendment prevents any construction of an anti-
dilution statute that would enjoin tarnishment in a non-
commercial context.257  However, in Anheuser-Busch, In., 25
the Eighth Circuit held that such a sweeping statement
should be limited to the facts of L.L. Bean, Inc."'
Even though the FTDA applies in a commercial con-
260 Actext, the Act does not clearly state a parody defense but
rather states a non-commercial use defense.26' When the
FTDA was introduced in Congress, sponsors of the bill ex-
plained that the law "will not prohibit or threaten noncom-
mercial expression, such as parody, satire, editorial and other
forms of expression that are not a part of a commercial trans-
250. See Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 45 (2d Cir. 1994); see,
e.g., Yankee Publ'g Inc. v. News Am. Publ'g Inc., 809 F. Supp. 267 (S.D.N.Y.
1992) (involving a defendant who published a Christmas edition of its trendy
New York magazine with a parody of the plaintiffs magazine, The Old Farmer's
Almanac, to introduce "thrift" as a new social value for its readers).
251. See MCCARTHY, supra note 37, § 24:72.
252. See Deere & Co., 41 F.3d at 45.
253. 73 F.3d 497 (2d Cir. 1996).
254. Id. at 507.
255. Id
256. 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987).
257. Id. at 33 (emphasis added).
258. 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994).
259. Id. at 778.
260. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2004) (stating that the Act applies to "an-
other person's commercial use in commerce of a mark").
261. See id. § 1125(c).
1206 Vol: 44
TRADEMARKPARODY
action."262 Consequently, tension still remains between the
FTDA and the First Amendment because the non-commercial
exemption does not apply to commercial speech.262
The Ninth Circuit followed the Hoffman rule in which
speech that is not purely commercial receives First Amend-
ment protection.2" In other words, use of another's mark that
simultaneously makes an editorial comment and serves a
commercial purpose enjoys full First Amendment protec-
tion.26" Thus, to determine whether a parody is exempt from
dilution law, the use of the mark as a whole must be exam-
ined. If any editorial or humorous comment is mixed in with
the commercial aspects, the commercial parts cannot be sepa-
rated and thus the parody would receive full First Amend-
ment protection.266
C. Alternatives to A void a Lanham Act Violation
A parody should only use so much of another trademark
that is necessary to convey its message.26 ' For example, in
Anhueser-Busch, Inc.,268 Balducci's parody implied that An-
heuser-Busch's products were contaminated with oil. 269 Be-
cause Balducci merely wanted to comment on the oil spill and
water pollution, this attack on Anheuser-Busch was unneces-
sary in the parody.20 Thus, Balducci may have avoided
trademark infringement and dilution by conveying his mes-
262. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 905 (9th Cir. 2002)
(quoting 141 CONG. REC. S19306-10, S19310 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement
of Sen. Hatch)).
263. See id. at 905 n.7.
264. See id. at 906 (citing Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d
1180, 1185-86 (9th Cir. 2001)). In Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., the de-
fendant published a digitally altered picture of the actor Dustin Hoffman from
the movie Tootsie so that Hoffman's character appeared to be wearing a de-
signer dress. Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1183. The Ninth Circuit granted the defen-
dant full First Amendment protection for non-commercial speech because the
article contained editorial value as a comment on classic films and actors. Id. at
1185.
265. See Mattel, Inc., 296 F.3d at 906.
266. See Hoffman, 255 F.3d 1180 at 1185.
267. See Lyons P'ship v. Giannoulas, 179 F.3d 384, 388 (5th Cir. 1999) (hold-
ing that the defendant's use of the plaintiffs trademark constituted parody be-
cause only the "minimum necessary" of the mark was used to evoke the origi-
nal).
268. 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994).
269. Id. at 778.
270. Id.
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sage in an alternative manner. Likewise, parodists can
choose alternative methods to comment on issues without the
risk of offending consumers."'
Because Balducci designed his advertisement to look as
closely as possible to a real Anheuser-Busch advertisement
and placed the parody on the back cover, the customary loca-
tion of real advertisements, consumers were unable to differ-
entiate between the original and the parody.2  Thus,
Balducci could have inserted disclaimers or altered the adver-
tisement to remind consumers that it was a parody. Con-
versely, the publisher of the Cliffs Notes parody did take sub-
stantial steps to avoid a likelihood of consumer confusion
despite using some of the identical colors and features of the
Cliffs Notes cover design.7 For instance, the Spy Notes cover
contained additional colors, a clay sculpture of New York City
rather than one of a bare cliff, and a more expensive price
quote."
Although the Second Circuit noted that, "[t]here is no re-
quirement that the cover of a parody carry a disclaimer that
it is not produced by the subject of the parody, and we ought
not to find such a requirement in the Lanham Act," '275 a dis-
claimer may constitute one factor considered in a likelihood of
trademark infringement or dilution. For instance, in Cliffs
Notes, Inc.,27 the label "A Satire" placed five times on the
cover of Spy NoteW7 may have helped consumers to avoid con-
fusion with the original Cliffs Notes.
V. A PROPOSAL FOR CONSISTENCY
As discussed previously, courts have inconsistently ap-
plied trademark laws to parodies.' To remedy this problem,
this comment proposes that Congress amend the Lanham Act
to create an explicit parody defense and to establish a set of
rules for the courts to follow in interpreting the Act.
271. See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604
F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1979).
272. See Anhueser-Busch, Inc., 28 F.3d at 774.
273. See Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g Group, Inc., 886
F.2d 490, 497 (2d Cir. 1989).
274. See id. at 496.
275. Id. at 496.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. See discussion supra Parts III-IV.
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First, Congress should add section 33(b)(10) to the
Lanham Act to describe a parody defense to trademark in-
fringement. The defense could read: "That the use of the
mark by another is in the form of parody and causes no like-
lihood of confusion."279 Congress would also have to amend
section 45280 to define "parody" in terms consistent with the
Second Circuit, as "convey[ing] two simultaneous-and con-
tradictory-messages: that it is the original, but also that it is
not the original and is instead a parody.
281
Second, because a parody can involve a mixture of com-
mercial and non-commercial use,282 a parody defense cannot
be sufficiently read into the non-commercial use defense of
section 43(c)(4)(B) for dilution causes of action.283 Thus, Con-
gress should add section 43(c)(4)(D) to the Lanham Act so
that a parody of a mark would not be actionable under 15
U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4).
Finally, Congress needs to develop flexible guidelines for
courts to interpret the parody defense correctly.2' Although
the factors to determine a likelihood of confusion may be sub-
jective,285 courts need to apply the factors with an awareness
of the effects of an intent to parody.286 Then, a finding of a
likelihood of confusion should be weighed against the public
interest in protecting the freedom of speech. To determine
whether the First Amendment interests outweigh the trade-
mark interests, courts can evaluate factors that may include
(1) the primary intent to parody for artistic or political rather
than economic reasons and (2) the presence of a disclaimer to
inform consumers that it is a parody. These factors weigh in
favor of a parody defense.
Because dilution does not depend upon a likelihood of
confusion,"8 Congress would need to apply a different set of
factors to allow a parody defense in dilution causes of action.
279. I propose that Congress should insert this section in 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b).
280. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2004).
281. Cliffs Notes, Inc., 886 F.2d at 494.
282. See discussion supra Part IV.B.3.
283. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(B).
284. Much like the parody and fair use defenses in copyright law, trademark
law should allow for a liberal application of a parody defense. See Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 594 (1994).
285. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
286. See Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1485 (10th
Cir. 1987).
287. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127; see also MCCARTHY, supra note 37, § 24:70.
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Similar to the recent Supreme Court decision in Moseley v. V
Secret Catalogue, Inc.," '8 a trademark owner will likely have
to prove that the parody actually diluted the mark to estab-
lish a violation of the FTDA. Furthermore, the courts should
grant full First Amendment protection to a parody that
makes any editorial comment, regardless of the presence of a
commercial purpose, because the use of the mark viewed as a
whole comprises some aspects of protected speech." 9 How-
ever, parodies in direct competition with the trademark
should receive less First Amendment protection. 9 °
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the Lanham Act is meant to protect a trade-
mark owner's rights from infringement and dilution, a parody
also serves a purpose in the public interest of freedom of
speech. Because the Lanham Act fails to adequately address
First Amendment protection for commercial parodies and
courts have interpreted the Act inconsistently,"' Congress
needs to balance these two competing concepts. Thus, Con-
gress should amend the Lanham Act to outline a specific par-
ody defense under trademark infringement and dilution.292
Furthermore, Congress would have to provide flexible guide-
lines for courts to follow in order to balance the First
Amendment and trademark concerns that are at odds.
288. Moseley v. V. Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 433 (2003) (holding
that the trademark owner must show evidence of actual dilution to establish a
violation of the FTDA).
289. See Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1185 (9th Cir.
2001).
290. See Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 45 (2d Cir. 1994).
291. See discussion supra Part II.
292. See discussion supra Part V.
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